Nearly five years after Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, the military Junta staged elections in late 2025 and early 2026 as a political pathway to restore stability in the country. But the recently held elections exposed the structural limits of the exercise, with half the electorate boycotting the process, minimal turnout, and polling stations across multiple townships were closed, relocated to different places, or abandoned altogether. While international and regional actors like the United Nations, the European Union, and the UK rejected the process as a sham, China emerged as the first major power to swiftly endorse the polls, framing them as orderly and representative. This article argues that Beijing’s support was not a neutral diplomatic gesture but a calculated effort to extend legitimacy to a deeply flawed electoral process. In doing so, China once again prioritises its strategic access, border stability, and economic interests over the expressed will of the Myanmar people.

China’s mediation in the Thailand–Cambodia conflict underscores a deliberate shift toward active regional conflict management under its Global Security Initiative. By intervening after ASEAN-led mechanisms failed to sustain a ceasefire, Beijing aims to stabilise critical economic corridors, safeguard security interests and embed itself into regional conflict resolution framework. At the same time, China’s engagement is also shaped by its strategic competition with the United States, advancing an “Asian” model of security governance that prioritizes dialogue and non-interference over external intervention. However, persistent arms transfer to both parties, questions over neutrality, and reluctance to pursue structural dispute-resolution mechanisms expose the limitations of China’s mediation model despite its growing diplomatic confidence.

The Hainan Free Trade Port represents China's boldest reform experiment since 1978, aiming to bring in a new stage of economic liberalization and globalization. Backed by strong central support, Hainan is uniquely positioned as a competitive rival to Hong Kong and Singapore in order to deepen China's integration with the global economy. As a long-term testing ground for institutional reform, it's success will hinge on sustained capital attraction and effective risk management, becoming a key strategic tool and indicating China's burgeoning interest in economic globalization.

Since 1949, work conferences have played a central role in shaping China’s national policy and governance under the CPC. Distinct from legislative sessions, they function as high-level forums for debate, policy review, and theoretical innovation, with outcomes later formalized through Party Plenums. Positioned between discussion and decision-making, these conferences allow the CPC to flexibly adjust policies and guide domestic and international governance.

This is the third of a six-part series analyzing the Taiwanese TV series ‘Zero Day Attack’ for the Organization for Research on China and Asia’s (ORCA) ‘Reviewing Chinese Culture’ segment.

चीन नेपाल को अपने क्षेत्रीय कनेक्टिविटी विज़न में एक प्रमुख पार्टनर के रूप में देखता आया है (खासकर ट्रांस-हिमालयन मल्टी-डाइमेंशनल कनेक्टिविटी नेटवर्क पहल के तहत, जो चीन की बड़ी बेल्ट एंड रोड पहल का हिस्सा है)। इस कॉरिडोर का मकसद बेहतर सड़कों, रेलवे और व्यापार मार्गों के ज़रिए नेपाल को लैंड-लॉक्ड से लैंड-लिंक्ड देश में बदलना है। लेकिन नेपाल की भ्रष्टाचार विरोधी एजेंसी द्वारा चीनी सरकारी कंस्ट्रक्शन फर्म पर चार्जशीट दायर करने के बाद ये संबंध किस रूप में सामने आते है, ये देखना होगा।

The Special Issue “India’s Soft Push for Power in South Asia: Shaping A Favourable Tomorrow” was ideated keeping in mind the increasing need for Indian policymakers to mitigate challenges emerging against New Delhi’s South Asian policy. Through each chapter, contributed by emerging Indian scholars specializing in India’s neighborhood policy, the publications envisions new and existing strategies to effectively leverage India’s soft power appeal in South Asia. 

Religious exchanges, especially pilgrimages to Mount Kailash, have long symbolized the fluid cultural ties and contested sovereignties between India, Tibet, and China. The recent reopening of the Kailash yātrā reflects cautious Sino-Indian rapprochement post-Galwan. However, such religious engagement implicitly challenges Beijing’s authority in Tibet. Pilgrimage remains a subtle yet potent site of geopolitical tension and cultural assertion.