Summary

Since 1949, work conferences have played a central role in shaping China’s national policy and governance under the CPC. Distinct from legislative sessions, they function as high-level forums for debate, policy review, and theoretical innovation, with outcomes later formalized through Party Plenums. Positioned between discussion and decision-making, these conferences allow the CPC to flexibly adjust policies and guide domestic and international governance.

Introduction

Since the conception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, work conferences have been crucial in determining national policy and governance outcomes. These conferences became a special feature of the administrative apparatus of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the 1950s as a way to coordinate and review policy execution at the highest level. These conferences are different from legislative sessions since they act as forums for debate and theoretical innovations that are later formalized and become legally binding through the Party Plenums. Thus, in China’s Party-led governance system, work conferences operate as a unique forum situated between debate and decision-making procedures. Without mainly depending on formal legislative processes, they enable the CPC to flexibly review the results of prior years, fix policy errors, bring together important stakeholders, and influence both domestic and international governance.

Earliest Work Conferences

One of the first instances of centralized work conferences was the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) work conference, which was held in July 1949 to coordinate labor and union policy under the new political leadership of the CPC. Soon thereafter, the First National United Front Work Conference convened, bringing together Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and influential members of the Party to discuss the principles and tasks of united front work across the country. Additionally, other early work conferences included the All-Army Security Work Conference, which focused on organizational discipline and internal security within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the First National Judicial Work Conference, which discussed the construction and functioning of the judiciary in the new state.

An especially historically important conference in this period was the 1961-1962 Seven Thousand Cadres Central Work Conference (七千人大会). This central work conference, attended by thousands of Party and government officials, was convened in response to the catastrophic economic consequences of the Great Leap Forward.  Its main goals were to reassess governance procedures and identify the root causes of the resulting famine. During this conference, senior officials publicly admitted policy errors and put forward proposals to decentralize economic policies and restore subsidies for struggling farmers. Such a degree of open policy critique was rare in early PRC history and illustrated how work conferences functioned as institutional mechanisms for crisis management and policy correction.

The 1978 Central Working Conference

One of the most important conferences that signaled a significant policy shift was the 1978 Central Working Conference (中央工作会议), which took place from November to December 1978. This work conference of the CPC Central Committee was crucial in shifting the Party’s strategic focus towards socialist modernization following the Cultural Revolution. During this conference, the Political Bureau publicly stated that it would reverse biased rulings handed down during the 1976 Tiananmen Protests. At the same meeting, participants endorsed Chen Yun’s proposal to address historical policy mistakes made by the Party and publicly denounced the notorious Gang of Four.

Beyond its immediate policy statements, the 1978 Central Working Conference served as a critical preparatory stage for broader institutional change within the Party. It provided a restricted but useful space for senior leaders to examine past political campaigns. By encouraging discussion on correcting historical injustices and updating the Party’s guiding principles, the conference laid out a solid political framework for more formal decisions to follow. In this manner, the conference functioned less as an endpoint and more as a catalyst that shaped the Party discourse for years to come. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, held later in December 1978, built upon Deng Xiaoping’s speech at this work conference, entitled “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, Unite as One, and Adopt a Forward-Looking Approach.” This session tackled the criticisms of the Cultural Revolution, formally shifted the Party’s priorities to economic development and modernization, and introduced the policies of “reform and opening up.”

Taken together, the 1978 conference represented both a shift in the nature of work conferences and China’s development. Work conferences became more institutionalized, and individual conferences began to concentrate on specific policy topics, each with its own stakeholders and policy goals.

Central Economic Work Conference and Core Economic Policy Formulation

In the reform and post-reform era, the Central Economic Work Conference (中央经济工作会议) has become the most established work conference. It serves as the CCP’s primary forum for assessing the state of the economy, both domestically and internationally, identifying structural issues, addressing policy failures, and setting socioeconomic targets for the upcoming year. The debates and speeches given in the conference have normative authority throughout the entire bureaucratic structure. These conferences, therefore, influence how central agencies, academics, and local authorities interact with economic policies.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central Economic Work Conference has assumed a more significant role in shaping the direction of policy responses. Post-pandemic conferences have consistently emphasized stabilizing employment, with particular attention to ensuring sufficient job opportunities for young college graduates and migrants. Alongside this, technological advancement has been repeatedly emphasized as a key factor that will influence economic growth at recent Central Economic Work Conferences.

Instead of treating artificial intelligence as a separate field, the “AI plus” program promoted in the conference held in 2025 aims to integrate it into governance systems and traditional sectors. This conference was attended by  President Xi, the Politburo, provincial leaders, and high-level executives of state-owned enterprises. The conference also paid special attention to the Hainan Free Trade Port as an important site for economic liberalization. Additionally, this year’s conference highlighted the importance of ensuring a stable birth rate across the country, noting that achieving this goal requires coordinated policy measures. In particular, it linked real estate, childcare incentives, and the education sector to demographic stability, emphasizing that these are key factors in encouraging families to have and raise children.

Rural Revitalization and the Central Rural Work Conference

The Central Rural Work Conference (中央农村工作会议) is a particularly important forum for reform in China’s policy architecture. At the 2022 Central Rural Work Conference, held in Beijing, President Xi called rural revitalization and agricultural modernization strategic pillars for China’s broader modernization goals. He stated that strengthening agriculture is foundational to building a modern socialist country, and that agriculture and rural modernization must keep pace with other aspects of national development and security. The conference emphasized topics like increasing grain output, “building a diversified food supply system,” poverty alleviation measures, as well as rural development to prevent a large-scale return to poverty.

Subsequently, the 2023 conference called for the implementation of the Green Rural Revival Program to discover technological and practical innovations to improve the effectiveness of existing policies. At the conference, President Xi stressed that ensuring the stable production of grain and other essential agricultural products remains a top priority for the Party. This includes maintaining consistent sown areas, increasing yields per unit, consolidating gains from expanded soybean cultivation, and developing compensation mechanisms between major grain-producing provinces and regions reliant on external supply. The conference also highlighted the importance of strengthening rural governance through Party building and promoting the Fengqiao Model (枫桥经验) to enhance grassroots management. Conference reports also emphasized debates revolving around the modernization of rural governance, enhancement of public services, and management of social risks stemming from land disputes, migration, and uneven development. As a result, rural revitalization was framed not just as an economic objective, but as a broader governance challenge requiring strong institutional capacity at the grassroots level. This approach was once again suggested at the 2024 Central Rural Work Conference, where President Xi highlighted the Fengqiao Model as a guiding framework for rural governance.

Central Conference on Work Related to the People’s Congresses: Party-Led Governance

Held in October 2021 to commemorate the CCP’s centenary, the Central Conference on Work Related to the People’s Congresses (中央人大工作会议) is an example of how work conferences extend beyond the arenas of rural and economic policy to influence Party politics and governance structures. President and General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that all state authority is exercised through institutionalized channels under the Party’s leadership and reaffirmed that the people’s congress system must operate under the leadership of the CCP. Additionally, Xi emphasized the need for the Party to modernize its institutional procedures. Key priorities included strengthening Party leadership, enhancing legal and procedural protections, advancing law-based governance, and improving oversight capacities of congresses to supervise state bodies. The conference reiterated that institutionalized procedures are necessary for the legitimacy and efficacy of government, and that the Party’s objectives must go hand in hand with reform and modernization. In this manner, work conferences become a direct reminder of where ultimate political authority lies in China, and align state institutions with the Party’s centralized control at the same time.

Regional Diplomacy and the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries

The Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries (中央周边工作会议), which took place in Beijing in 2025, shapes China’s diplomatic goals and foreign policy in its neighborhood. This conference detailed the principles of an orderly multipolar world that were espoused by President Xi in the 2023 Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries. It was held in 2025 was attended by the President and members of the Politburo Standing Committee. It outlined objectives and policy directions for the upcoming year, while also reviewing China’s accomplishments in neighborhood diplomacy. In his keynote address, President Xi highlighted the value of creating a “community with a shared future with neighboring countries,” describing China’s border regions as vital for national security and a priority in its foreign policy objectives. The conference emphasized that China’s relations with neighboring countries are at their best in modern times, with regional and global dynamics increasingly intertwined. Guided by Xi Jinping Thought, it encouraged strengthening mutual trust, deepening development integration, enhancing connectivity and cooperation in trade, investment, and maintaining regional stability. The conference also highlighted the need for stronger “centralized and unified” leadership with President Xi at the “core,” better foreign affairs legal frameworks, the promotion of  “theoretical and practical innovations in its neighborhood work,” and the need for China to cohesively coordinate the “top two priorities of development and security.”

Conclusion

Beyond the conferences discussed above, a wide range of other central work conferences operate as part of this model. The Central Conference on Comprehensive Rule of Law and the Central Political and Legal Work Conference reinforce law-based governance and social stability under Party leadership. At the societal level, the Central United Front Work Conference, Central Party Mass Work Conference, and Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs focus on “emancipating the mind,” maintaining social cohesion, a sense of community, ethnic relations, and grassroots engagement. The Central Urban Work Conferences tackle topics associated with urbanization and demographic change, and planning to make cities “organic living entities.”  Additionally, the Central Talent Work Conference debates are concerned with human capital development. In the military arena, there exist four separate Central Military Work Conferences that debate topics ranging from political work within the military, development of young talent, the duties and tasks of the PLA, and policy and systemic reform.

In conclusion, work conferences remain a key part of how China shapes its future. These conferences are a way for China to stay flexible and adapt to new challenges while emphasizing the Party’s central role in this process. They are more than just symbolic meetings, and form the backbone of China’s top-down governance model by providing structured arenas for debate and policy review. Within this forum, specific components of “Xi Jinping Thought” are refined and institutionalized. These conferences also effectively bring together policy stakeholders within a controlled environment. This allows for a measure of policy cohesiveness across sectors. Thus, work conferences will remain critical forums within China’s decision-making processes. They help translate ideology into concrete policy goals, reinforce coordination across different verticals, signal policy shifts to foreign actors, and ensure that long-term strategic objectives are consistently reviewed and debated.

Image Credits: Xinhua

Author

Chitra Nair

Chitra Nair is a recent postgraduate in Chinese Studies from SOAS University of London, holding a bachelor’s degree in International Relations with a minor in Environmental Studies from FLAME University, India. Her research explores contemporary Chinese politics, digital activism, political expression and censorship. She is especially interested in how the state and citizens negotiate power and legitimacy, questions which she seeks to explore through a political sociology lens. She previously interned at the Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi, where she published work on media censorship and the queer community in China. Her dissertation, Digital Panopticon : Activism and State Surveillance in China, examines digital activism and censorship in China through three key case studies.