PROJECT OF THE CENTURY

China’s dramatic announcement of the Medong County dam as a ‘project of the century’ has justifiably created ripples of anxiety in the downstream riparian states of South Asia, now alerted to the accelerated development of the hydropower project. The groundbreaking ceremony of the project was presided over by China’s premier Li Qiang, who visited Nyingchi during an inspection tour of South-West Tibet, reflecting China’s determination to proceed with the controversial dam on the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo river. A hydro-electric project worth 167 billion USD capable of generating three times the electricity as the Three Gorges dam, construction of the Medong County Dam marks a significant inflection point in India-China bilateral tensions and intensifies the securitization of the Himalayan watershed. As a transboundary river infrastructure project, it holds profound implications not only for Sino-Indian relations but also for the ecological and geopolitical stability of lower riparian South Asian states.

The timing and nature of the project begs the question; even though it is aware of the downstream security concerns, what factors into China’s decision to proceed with such a sensitive project? And perhaps more importantly, what are the implications for India and South Asia’s downstream riparian states? A combination of domestic factors like energy security concerns, reinforcing state influence through SOE-led large-scale infrastructure and regional development of Tibet explains why Beijing is undertaking a challenging, sensitive and geopolitically risky project in the Himalayas. At the same time, the influence of external factors relating to China’s relations with India, as well as the Dalai Lama’s recent succession announcement, cannot be discounted. Whatever the motivations for Beijing’s decision to pursue its “mega dam” project, the potential impact, both ecologically and politically, are being weighed and assessed downstream.

Domestic Drivers

Top-down energy security planning has positioned Xi Jinping’s directives on hydroelectric power generation at the center of the rationale to develop the Medong county dam. At a symposium on promoting the development of Western China held in April 2024, Xi laid out the focus for hydroelectric development; Western China “must strengthen a number of important national energy bases” and “enhance the ability to transmit electricity from west to east”. Transmitting electricity from China’s western regions has always been considered necessary to sustain industrial activity in power-deficient provinces in the east. China has also made clear its ambition to become a leading player in renewable energy infrastructure, is already home to the world’s largest hydroelectric project, and values the engineering prowess that the dam reflects on China’s international reputation, as seen in state media championing China’s achievements in building megastructures.

These factors combined, along with China’s energy security constraints, continue to motivate the decision to develop hydroelectric energy bases like the Medong dam and upgrade the West-to-East Power Transmission capacity in Tibet. Hydroelectricity accounted for 53.72% of Tibet’s electricity exports in 2023, but with installed capacity only 1% of Tibet’s total hydroelectric potential, the Party leadership considers infrastructure like the Medong county dam a solution to its energy security concerns. The project will also support China’s pledge to reduce carbon emissions, which is likely to feature prominently in its 15th Five-Year Plan.

Taking cues from the directives issued by central planners, the dedicated executors of the Medong county dam are sub-national actors like State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and local governments. SOEs have typically been enthusiastic about driving forward projects of political significance, as evidenced by Chairman of China Power Construction Group Yan Zhitong’s remarks on the Medong county dam as a “historic opportunity” for China’s hydropower industry. Moreover, SOEs created specifically to implement major projects — like the State Grid Corporation which was created  to deliver on the ambitious strategy of transmitting electricity from China’s west to east— tend to enjoy significant political power and pursue projects to advance their own interests. Similarly, the China Yajiang Group was created recently by the Party Central Committee to ensure the construction of the Yarlung Zangbo hydropower project. Reflecting the strategic importance of the company and its purpose, the SOE was unveiled by Politburo member and Vice Premier Zhang Guoqiang. It is likely that development of the Medong county project will be significantly accelerated by a dedicated SOE in charge of its construction, keen to advance its own interests.

Provincial and local governments in Tibet are key regional actors keen on the development of the Medong county dam in the name of economic development and people’s welfare. Tibet’s provincial government has called for planning and construction of hydropower in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo in its 14th Five Year Plan, framing it as a necessity for regional economic development. Complementing this approach, local governments position the Medong hydropower project as a cornerstone of people’s livelihoods and prosperity; the 13th Five Year Plan for Water Conservancy and Development in Linzhi City argues that the previous installed hydropower station is inadequate to meet the electricity needs of local farmers and herdsmen. By framing the new Medong county dam as a necessary investment to improve the livelihoods of Chinese nationals, local governments are generating legitimacy for large state infrastructure in Tibet and securing their position in delivering the same to the region.  

Impact on India, Tibet and Transboundary Politics

Beijing’s decision to build a mega-dam over the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet has in many ways raised concerns in New Delhi over its transboundary water security and potential ecological risks in Northeast India. While the technical feasibility and actual impact of the construction has been questioned, the political reading of such a development is hard to dismiss for any downstream riparian. China’s announcement comes barely two weeks after the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday celebration in India and at a moment when India-China ties are approaching a cautious diplomatic thaw. 

The announcement has not gone unnoticed in India’s northeast either, where rivers, ecology and geopolitics are deeply entangled in local livelihoods; and now places China’s dam project at the centre of growing political sensitivities. In Arunachal Pradesh, long claimed by China as “South Tibet,” the move is being viewed not just as another cross-border infrastructure development but as a fresh signal of Beijing’s disregard for India’s concerns.

For instance, State Chief Minister Pema Khandu described the dam as the state’s “biggest issue… after the military threat,” likening it to a potential “water bomb”. He warned that any sudden release of water could devastate the Siang region, including indigenous Adi communities, with direct consequences for land and livelihoods. The state leadership has already initiated infrastructural ramp-ups in response and has received support from the central government too.  The state government, supported by the Jal Shakti Ministry and other relevant central agencies, is advancing the 10–11 GW Siang Upper Multipurpose Project. Framed as a strategic buffer, the project aims to mitigate disaster risks and ensure long-term water security in the region. However, even with its strong strategic rationale, the project continues to face resistance from local communities, who have raised concerns over ecological degradation and displacement of livelihoods such a response is set to cause.

In the Indian state of Assam, where the Brahmaputra brings both disaster and prosperity, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has issued public statements urging vigilance and close monitoring of the Chinese dam’s potential security effects. While Sarma has attempted to allay immediate fears by noting that the Brahmaputra gets much of its flow from rain and local tributaries, he has acknowledged that disruptions, either reduced flows or sudden releases, could impact the livelihoods of millions reliant on the river. He emphasized that both scenarios (flood or shortage) could have severe implications and that the central government would be in a better position to weigh the ongoing assessments and take appropriate diplomatic moves. 

Yet beyond ecological anxiety, what is becoming increasingly evident is that China’s upstream hydropower ambitions are beginning to reshape India’s internal developmental ambitions and political calculus. In both Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, the development of major hydro projects, policy advocacy for increased infrastructure, and greater public engagements with the issue reflects a multi-level response to the risks posed by the Medong dam. Concerns about water availability, altered seasonal flow, increased flooding risks and loss to livelihoods have prompted coordinated actions between state and central agencies. Yet unlike other border tensions, the Brahmaputra issue cannot be managed solely through military preparedness or diplomatic manoeuvring. In states like Assam, where floods are already a volatile electoral issue and inter-state water sharing is deeply contentious, any disruption, real or perceived, risks escalating into internal political crises. It is therefore that, Beijing’s upstream activities are no longer being viewed as an external provocation, but as significantly shaping India’s internal developmental priorities and even electoral strategies in sensitive border states. The challenge is  not just strategic but also systemic for New Delhi, demanding an integrated national response that goes beyond conventional foreign policy playbooks. 

The construction of the Medong dam marks a new inflection point in the evolving India-China relationship. But what makes this case especially sensitive is the friction emerging from clashing domestic needs on both sides. For Beijing, the dam is a tool for boosting energy capacity, reinforcing state presence in Tibet, and projecting infrastructural prowess. For New Delhi, however, the same project threatens ecological stability, disrupts local livelihoods, and challenges the delicate political equation between the Centre and its northeastern border states. Thus, as climate vulnerabilities intensify and the politics of development become more securitized, projects like the Medong dam risk becoming flashpoints in an already fragile bilateral relationship. Navigating this terrain will require not just diplomatic foresight, but also mechanisms for transboundary water-sharing dialogues and transparency that acknowledge each side’s core interests without jeopardizing cooperation under the weight of geopolitical rivalries.

Image: CCTV