General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Xi Jinping’s momentous visit to Tibet on the 60th anniversary of Tibet Autonomous Region’s (TAR) foundation was a carefully orchestrated display of unity and strength by the Party. Its optics, timing and significance suggest the Party seeks to reinforce and accelerate the implementation of its vision for Tibet, especially in light of the 14th Dalai Lama’s statement regarding his reincarnation. The delegation of high-level central leaders travelling to Lhasa underlined the drivers and contours giving shape to the governance of Tibet; political stability, regional development and securing Party control. But the focus on domestic governance tells only half the story.

The TAR visit was about China’s external relations as much as it was about domestic political priorities. The visit, just as Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in New Delhi to discuss bilateral relations with India, sends a message conveying the centrality of Tibet in China’s security thinking, and by extension to the stability of India-China relations. With external dynamics evolving alongside domestic political priorities, the Tibet trip is a sharp reminder that TAR’s domestic political and development trajectory remains highly relevant to India’s security and is central to the security and strategic engagement between India and China. With the Party’s insistence on stability and border security, and infrastructure projects like the Medong county dam threatening riparian security of downstream states, India is likely to become increasingly wary of internal developments and dynamics of TAR.

Spectacle of Strength amidst Tightening Policy

The Party’s TAR visit stands out because it was the first time a General Secretary of the CPC attended such an event. Previously, the highest-ranking leader at  anniversary celebrations in TAR was the then Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC, Yu Zhengsheng, in 2015. Xi Jinping’s presence at the celebrations has raised the political profile of TAR, and its political and security situation is now more closely associated with his image.

The General Secretary was accompanied by a large entourage of high-profile leaders, which suggests a desire to strengthen centralisation of policy action and project the importance of TAR for China’s external and internal objectives. The delegation included 2 Standing Committee and 5 Politburo members; Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Zhang Guoqing, He Lifeng and Li Ganjie, along with central government and military officials like Wang Xiaohong, Hu Chunhua and Zhang Shengmin. Speeches and visits by the delegation underscored the Party’s governance priorities for TAR; ensuring stability, accelerating development and maintaining Party authority.

The focus on stability by high-level leaders was the defining policy priority at the 60th anniversary celebrations. This is unsurprising as it remains a continuous effort by Beijing to secure its control of far-flung provinces where ethnic groups are a majority of the population. Xi Jinping’s remarks that, “governing, stabilizing, and developing Tibet primarily requires maintaining political stability, social stability, ethnic unity, and religious harmony in Tibet”, make it clear that stability is prized over all other objectives in Tibet. This is maintained through the large presence of armed forces and security infrastructure, justified Zhang Guoqing, who stated, “political and legal teams stationed in Tibet are important forces in maintaining national security”. The emphasis on stability and national security is perhaps a reflex to pre-empt any potential internal or external disruptions.

Stability also involved greater focus on policies to integrate Tibetans with Chinese socialism, a process underway for more than a decade. Policy decisions in the name of “ethnic unity” are likely to accelerate with Xi calling for promotion of the standard written and spoken Chinese language. Furthermore, trends like the migration of Han Chinese into Tibet, urbanisation of population centres, deployment of party cadres from around the country to Tibet and adjustments of Tibetan Buddhism to align with Party ideology, will likely intensify following the directives issued by Party leaders.

Regional development is also set to intensify and expand, a directive issued in Wang Huning’s speech that, “Tibet's modernization drive also stands at a new historical starting point”. Although Tibet’s development has disproportionally focused on infrastructure projects, like rail lines and hydroelectric projects, party leaders have backed this approach. Furthermore, the domestic development trajectory of Tibet is now set to have wider, external implications. For instance, Xi told local government leaders to accelerate major projects in Tibet like hydropower dams on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo, a veiled reference to the Medong county dam, called China’s project of the century. The dam is emerging as a major flashpoint in India-China relations and increasingly brings into focus the domestic development trajectory of Tibet for India-China strategic and security relations.

Lastly, an unsaid but equally important feature of the Party’s priorities in Tibet has to do with centralised control. The Party has purged or removed numerous high-ranking Tibetan and non-Tibetan officials and several lower-level ones working in TAR over the last year on charges of corruption. For example, one Tibetan and the former Governor of TAR, Qi Zhala was removed for accepting bribes and participating in “superstitious activities”, a reference to religious practices banned for officials. The sharp increase in purged officials indicates that the Party is pursuing greater centralisation of the governance and administrative apparatus in TAR.

External Subtext

While the domestic governance contours of China’s Tibet policy are compelling and vocalised adequately by the Party, external policy signals of Xi’s TAR visit lie below the surface. Looking closer at the timing of Xi’s visit, it becomes clear that it happened just as Wang Yi’s visit to India was concluded, a signal that Tibet’s security is a component of the India-China border equation for China. The TAR visit is a sign that China’s security concerns in Tibet may be inextricable from any resolution of the India-China border dispute. In fact, during the visit and since the 18th Party Congress, Xi and his delegation have routinely emphasised the importance of border security as one of the “four major tasks” in TAR. During his visit, Xi visited troops stationed in Tibet and met with officers above the Colonel rank; emphasising Tibet’s role as a “national security barrier” not just the context of domestic governance but also in China’s external relations with India.

The visit also confirms that Beijing is striving to cultivate advantages in Tibet that give it the upper hand in the balance of power and border negotiations with India. The July 21 announcement by Li Qiang that the Medong county dam will begin construction and now, Xi’s veiled directive to accelerate its construction, makes it almost certain that the dam will be developed into a flashpoint in India-China security dynamics. Perhaps China is cultivating a bargaining chip for negotiations with India, but with the sanction of the top leadership, riparian relations between India and China are now certain to become further securitised.

Moreover, China’s position that the Medong county dam and development policies of Tibet are an internal matter is likely to harden as India raises objections to such projects. Tibet’s development trajectory and infrastructure projects are becoming increasingly relevant to India’s border security and entangled with security competition with China.  

Another sensitivity with an external dimension is the issue of the Dalai Lama’s succession. Xi’s visit to TAR and reiteration of stability and security is a clear indication that Beijing is unwilling to allow the Dala Lama’s succession issue to impact China’s control in Tibet. A high-profile visit to TAR just a month after the Dalai Lama’s announcement of a successor outside China and outside China’s influence, signals a hardening stance by Beijing; that China will persist with its integration strategy in Tibet and legitimise Party-appointed Tibetan institutions. Perhaps Xi’s visit is preparing the ground for China’s counter measures in TAR, for when the Dalai Lama’s succession process is initiated. For India, this means China is also preparing for a decision by New Delhi to support or legitimise the Dalai Lama’s succession.

Future Outlook

India and China’s bilateral relations have moved closer towards normalisation since October 2024 and Wang Yi’s latest visit to Delhi has seen India and China invest greater diplomatic capital in dialogue and negotiation to address a troublesome boundary question. However, developments in Tibet are likely to exert significant influence on India and China’s security outlook. Xi’s visit to TAR was a sharp reminder that developments in Tibet are closely tied to border security concerns for India; the Medong county dam is raising significant concerns about a “water bomb” in some Indian states and its construction could greatly accentuate security dilemmas in sensitive border regions.

For China, the Dalai Lama’s recent remarks on the succession issue have possibly resulted in Beijing’s hardening stance and reiteration of control in Tibet. It also explains any Party moves towards preparing the ground for succession outcomes. Both the domestic governance priorities of the Party and China’s external signalling are indicating an increasing in the complexity of security dynamics between India and China.

Image Source: Xinhua/Yan Yan

Author

Rahul Karan Reddy is a Senior Research Associate at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). He works on domestic Chinese politics and trade, producing data-driven research in the form of reports, dashboards and digital media. He is the author of ‘Islands on the Rocks’, a monograph about the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute between China and Japan. Rahul was previously a research analyst at the Chennai Center for China Studies (C3S). He is the creator of the India-China Trade dashboard and the Chinese Provincial Development Indicators dashboard. His work has been published in The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, ISDP & Tokyo Review, among others. He can be reached @RahulKaranRedd1 on Twitter.

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