CHINA'S ENDORSEMENT OF MYANMAR MILITARY REBRAND

For the first time since the 2021 coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing made a state visit to China, attending both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and the World War II victory day parade in Beijing. The visit, extended at the invitation of President Xi Jinping, carried significance beyond ceremonial diplomacy. It came at a moment when the international community is scrutinizing Myanmar’s political trajectory after the junta’s dissolution of four years of emergency rule and its promise of elections as a pathway out of prolonged instability.

The SCO summit emerged as a testing ground for this political reconfiguration, with Myanmar’s immediate neighbors, China and India, engaging Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines. In Tianjin, Min Aung Hlaing met with Xi Jinping and later traveled to Chengdu, where he directly appealed to Chinese investors, culminating in the signing of seven Memoranda of Understanding. This highlighted Beijing’s readiness to give political support for the newly established State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) with concrete economic commitments. Whereas, India’s engagement was more cautious. While New Delhi has refrained from issuing statements explicitly endorsing the SSPC, it has continued pragmatic engagement with Myanmar’s military leadership. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the SCO exemplified this calibrated posture, reflecting India’s ongoing effort to balance normative commitments to democracy with geostrategic imperatives in the region.

However, it is China, the country’s most influential external actor, whose response will largely shape Myanmar’s immediate political trajectory. Beijing immediately welcomed the political change, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined three lofty goals — peace, reconciliation, and economic development — in his meeting with Myanmar’s Union Minister for Foreign Affairs on 14th August 2025. The message is clear: Beijing is ready to embrace the new SSPC and lend it diplomatic cover. While the SSPC represents a revamp for Myanmar’s generals, for China it signals strategic continuity — that ensures access and influence. Against this backdrop, a pressing question emerges: does Beijing’s embrace of Myanmar’s military reflect a sustainable strategy for regional stability, or a short-term calculation that risks entrenching volatility at the core of its own strategic corridor?

Why Does Beijing Endorse the Rebrand?

China’s swift endorsement of Myanmar’s new interim government is less about the country’s domestic politics and more about insulating Beijing’s strategic stakes. The military’s repositioning holds significance for China for three key reasons: ensuring the continuity of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) under terms more favorable to Beijing, maintaining Myanmar’s alignment within China’s geopolitical sphere, and preempting the rise of competing regional or Western influences.

First, for Beijing, Myanmar is a hinge state in the BRI. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Rakhine and the parallel oil-and-gas pipelines connecting Rakhine port and Yunnan provide China with a rare overland route to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. Continuity of these projects is critical, which is why Beijing views the new military administration as preferable to prolonged instability or a transition that might empower actors less amenable to Chinese interests.

Second, in recent years, Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly asserted that only military rule can unlock China’s strategic ambitions in Myanmar. He has used long-stalled projects, such as the controversial Myitsone Dam and various hydropower initiatives suspended before the Coup due to environmental and debt-related concerns, as bargaining chips with Beijing. Even the highly controversial Myitsone Dam has occasionally been floated, not as a genuine concession, but as a strategic lure to secure Chinese financing and political support. Beijing, however, is not merely humoring these overtures; it is actively capitalizing on them. Endorsing the SSPC, therefore, serves both sides: it offers the generals a veneer of legitimacy to court external backing, while giving China the continuity and predictability it requires for its strategic projects. 

Third, Myanmar sits at the fault line between South and Southeast Asia, offering China both a buffer on its southwest frontier and a counterweight to India’s influence in the Bay of Bengal. By retaining political influence in Myanmar, the Chinese are also looking to ensure that Naypyidaw is akin to their moves post US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Wang Yi’s language of “sovereignty, independence, and national unity” reflects Beijing’s deeper concern: ensuring no outside power, particularly Western states or India, gains decisive influence in Myanmar. 

This logic also shapes Beijing’s distrust of non-military actors. While Beijing holds considerable influence over ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), particularly in northern Shan State, Chinese officials perceive that their loyalty is limited and often in ways shaped by their own survival strategies. The same caution applies to the National Unity Government (NUG). China believes that the NUG maintains channels to the US, raising fears that a non-military takeover could tilt Myanmar westward. By backing the reframed military administration, Beijing ensures that the balance of power stays with a regime dependent on Chinese investment and diplomatic cover, rather than risk a political realignment that could dilute its influence.  

Risks for China in Backing Myanmar’s Rebranded Regime

Within days of the SSPC’s formation, Chinese ambassador Ma Jia and Deputy Foreign Minister U Ko Ko Kyaw signed off on 14 new “small and midsize projects”. Furthermore, a transfer of USD 3.3 million in cash to support the new regime has also been made: a clear signal that business would continue uninterrupted. The seven MOUs signed in Chengdu exemplify this quid pro quo, translating political endorsement into immediate economic commitments. Yet this embrace has also intensified resentment among Myanmar citizens. For many, Beijing is no longer seen as a neutral power but as the junta’s lifeline, shielding Min Aung Hlaing from isolation while pushing forward its BRI investments. 

The backlash is visible across multiple fronts. Six Ta’ang rights organizations, including the Ta’ang Students and Youth Union, issued a joint statement accusing China of aiding the junta’s war crimes by supplying weapons and surveillance technology. Additionally, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army General Tar Bone Kyaw publicly denounced China’s “self-interested” interference as one of the greatest obstacles to Myanmar’s revolution. 

With pipelines, ports, and economic corridors cutting through some of the most conflict-prone parts of the country, anti-China sentiment could translate into sabotage, blockades, or even direct attacks on Chinese nationals —a scenario that has precedent in Myanmar’s recent past. What secures Beijing’s investments in the short term may ultimately undermine them in the long run. Currently, China risks alienating both EAOs and the broader Myanmar public sentiment. This is the central paradox of China’s strategy: Beijing claims to prioritize stability and safe borders, its disregard for the concerns of the majority of the Myanmar population may ultimately exacerbate  the very instability it seeks to avoid. 

Regional Implications

From New Delhi’s vantage point, China’s deepened entrenchment in Myanmar adds another layer of complexity to an already intricate strategic landscape. India has so far adopted a posture of calibrated restraint, contrasted with Beijing’s far more explicit support and involvement in Myanmar’s political trajectory. This divergence raises strategic concerns for India. Not only do Chinese projects run adjacent to Indian-funded infrastructure, but the potential spillover effects of instability across India’s sensitive Northeast, where cross-border dynamics remain volatile, further compound New Delhi’s security and geopolitical challenges. 

Additionally, China’s support for the military regime presents a possibility that opposition forces and EAOs may increasingly view New Delhi as a credible partner. This would position India as a potential external player in Myanmar’s contested political milieu, even as it must carefully navigate the intertwined challenges of bilateral diplomacy and regional security.

Moreover, China’s Myanmar policy highlights a core strategic contradiction. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of peace, development, and regional connectivity, yet its explicit support for the military regime entrenches coercive rule to safeguard its strategic and economic interests. By anchoring its investments to the Tatmadaw, China may secure pipelines, ports, and corridors in the immediate term, but it simultaneously fuels anti-China sentiment domestically and widens geopolitical fault lines regionally. Beijing’s pursuit of short-term predictability may sow the very instability that transforms Myanmar from a strategic gateway into a long-term liability.

Photo Credit: Xinhua