The abrupt removal of senior officials within the PLA and prolonged vacancies at the top of key portfolios have together disrupted what was once a relatively predictable pattern of elite management under Xi Jinping, with direct implications how a future leadership transition will play out.

The investigation of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, along with CMC member Liu Zhenli, who heads the Joint Staff Department, marks one of the most consequential military purges in Xi Jinping’s third term as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman. Senior leadership purges within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been on the rise, particularly over the last two years, with the anti-corruption campaign now leaving the military decision-making body with just two functioning members, one of whom is Xi himself. The abrupt removal of senior officials within the PLA and prolonged vacancies at the top of key portfolios have together disrupted what was once a relatively predictable pattern of elite management under Xi Jinping.

Much of the early reporting has framed Zhang’s removal primarily through the lens of grave political or security violations, including allegations of espionage and disloyalty. Yet such explanations sit uneasily with both the timing of the purge and Xi’s established approach to handling politically existential threats.

What makes Zhang’s removal politically consequential, however, is not the allegations surrounding his fall but the role he occupied within Xi Jinping’s leadership architecture. As one of the few remaining senior figures whose authority predated Xi’s consolidation of power, Zhang represented continuity at the very top of the military system. His presence offered reassurance that seniority, experience and long-standing political relationships still carried weight within an increasingly centralised power order. The removal of He Weidong and Miao Hua last year, followed by Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli now, signals a further contraction of that space, with direct implications for how a future leadership transition might be managed. The scale and visibility of these purges also suggest a deeper trust deficit between the Party leadership and the PLA’s senior officers, indicating that Xi does not assume institutional loyalty even within the armed forces.

Implications for Succession Politics

Succession in the CPC has never been governed solely by formal rules. Even during periods of relative stability, leadership transitions depended on elite consensus and the careful balancing of fractional interests. The PLA, in particular, has played a stabilising role by providing continuity and reassurance during moments of such political change.

The removal of Zhang Youxia along with other CMC members is sure to disrupt this equilibrium. With deep institutional networks and informal influence, Zhang served as a bridge between the old military guard and the newer cohort that rose under his patronage. His purge, along with other senior officials, now weakens these networks through which military elites might have otherwise facilitated or cushioned a future transition.

At one level, the message to potential successors as well as the military brass is clear: no one is immune from scrutiny; proximity to Xi, past loyalty or shared political history offer no lasting assurance against scrutiny that may propel through corruption or dissent. In such an environment, long-term coalition-building becomes both risky and unattractive. Yet such messaging internally would also introduce a new layer of uncertainty by signalling both the risks of visibility and the costs of inaction. Rather than resolving elite anxieties, this contradictory internal messaging is more likely to deepen them across the political spectrum, affecting their ability to manage and act in moments of crisis.

Succession as a Deferred Problem

By removing figures across factions, targeting not only rivals but also individuals previously regarded as loyal, Xi has consolidated control in the short term while simultaneously reshaping the elite Party system, one which he will eventually have to leave behind. However, many of those sidelined or purged continue to retain informal networks and incentives that may not align with preserving Xi’s political legacy once he exits the scene. In this context, succession becomes less about identifying a loyal heir and more about managing the structural uncertainty produced by an elite system increasingly shaped by purges at the highest levels.

These developments eventually leave the CPC’s General Secretary with increasingly narrow options. One path would be to defer the succession, either indefinitely or by reverting to a “Chairman-style” arrangement in which he retains his position at the CMC while moving out of his other posts. Such an approach could extend his effective control even beyond the 21st Party Congress, allowing him to personally manage the risks associated with an eventual exit. The alternative is to engineer succession so tightly that the next leader is not merely loyal to Xi as an individual, but structurally bound to preserving the political direction he has imposed even after his departure.

Inevitably both options carry significant costs. A prolonged rule will increase elite fatigue and institutional strain, especially under such political circumstances, while excessive control over succession will reduce flexibility and raise the costs of any eventual transition. In either case, the continued purging of senior figures has eroded the informal mechanisms that have historically absorbed political shocks, including those critical to the succession process.

In many ways, the significance of Zhang Youxia’s purge lies less in the specific allegations surrounding his fall and more in what it reveals about the evolving structure of elite politics under Xi Jinping. By dismantling networks faster than they can be replaced, Xi has strengthened his position in the short term while increasing uncertainty about the future.

Nonetheless, Chinese elite politics has rarely unfolded in predictable ways. What can be said with greater confidence is that succession, rather than opposition or institutional resistance, remains the most unresolved variable in Xi’s political initiative. The removal of Zhang Youxia does not resolve that problem but only deepens it.

 

(Image Credit: CNA/ Hu Chushi)

Author

Ratish Mehta is a Senior Research Associate at ORCA. He is the co-editor of the Special Issue on India’s Soft Power Diplomacy in South Asia and serves as the co-lead for the project ‘The Episodes of India-China Exchanges: Modern Bridges and Resonant Connections’, which is rooted in the desire to enhance public consciousness of cross-cultural contributions of both societies. Ratish’s area of interest includes understanding the value of Narratives, Rhetoric and Ideology in State and Non-State interactions, deconstructing political narratives in Global Affairs as well as focusing on India’s Foreign Policy interests in the Global South and South Asia. He was previously associated with The Pranab Mukherjee Foundation and has worked on projects such as Indo-Sino relations, History of the Constituent Assembly of India and the Evolution of its Democratic Institutions. He is also the co-convenor of ORCA's Global Conference on New Sinology (GCNS), which is India's premier dialogue driven China conference. He is an alumnus of Ambedkar University, Delhi.

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