FROM NYOMA TO MORAN

The recent landing of an Indian Air Force (IAF) C-130-J aircraft on February 14, 2026, at Moran Emergency Landing  Facility (ELF) was a bold statement by India that it would no longer be reactive in protecting its territorial integrity. With only Leh and Thoise as full-fledged runways in Ladakh, operations in that area have always been challenging due to poor road infrastructure and minimal air connectivity. Development of Nyoma Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) into a regular runway capable of sustaining full-spectrum air operations is a strategic game-changer. The airfield was officially inaugurated on November 12, 2025 with the first landing carried out in a C-130 J aircraft by Air Chief Marshal AP Singh who is also a test pilot, sending a signal that the Indian Air Force leads from the front.

Infrastructure development across both sides of the India-China border has continued with increasing momentum in recent years, leading to higher deployment along with a concomitant reduction in trust. Upgradation of Nyoma airfield was aimed at enhancing flexibility of military response and facilitating Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While Nyoma airfield offers several advantages, it also displays national resolve to secure the region against any aggressive intent. This must be viewed in the broader context of the development of the region.

Figure 1: Location of Nyoma 

Source: Google Earth, with author's insertion of details

The strategic significance of the base also lies in its ability to considerably reduce response time in operations compared to IAF’s Leh and Thoise airfields (Figure 1). The base would facilitate rapid induction of troops, heavy equipment and supplies, along with medical evacuation and enable last-mile connectivity in an area constrained by limited road infrastructure. The base also has strong deterrent value especially in sensitive sectors such as Demchok, Pangong Tso, Depsang-Chushul axis and Hamle and it enables sustained Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations.

In high-altitude areas, infrastructure development for air operations needs to be designed around the hard realities of extreme elevation and vulnerability to enemy attack. The emphasis, therefore, needs to be on sustainability, redundancy and survivability. The proximity of Nyoma to the LAC makes it vulnerable to attacks by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) as well as the PLA's integral artillery. However, because Nyoma is the only airfield in the region capable of supporting fighter and strategic transport operations, redundancy becomes a major operational consideration.

There are many constraints and challenges when operating from high-altitude airfields. High-altitude significantly affects lift and engine performance, requiring longer take-off runs and reducing payload capacity. Weather uncertainty and terrain impose additional operational planning requirements. The development of infrastructure is slow, and the construction of Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), Fuel Oils and Lubricants (FOL) storage and Weapon Storage Areas (WSA) is tedious. In winter months, snow-clearing equipment is required, and summer operations are affected by ‘hot and high’ conditions due to increased ambient temperatures.

Ngari Gunsa and Hotan: Operational Analysis

China has five major airfields in Tibet, including three opposite Eastern Ladakh (EL) at Ngari Gunsa, Hotan and Kashgar (Figure 2). The PLAAF airfields are well developed, located in depth and have the advantage of being able to sustain large-scale operations. However, due to the high elevation of these airfields, operations from them have serious weight and payload penalties. Aircraft would need to get airborne with minimal fuel and maximum weapons due to temperature and elevation considerations. Once airborne, aircraft would need to carry out aerial refueling to enhance their combat radius of action. This would entail significant time penalties and also make them vulnerable to long-range air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons. Due to large distances from each other, most airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang do not mutually support  operations. Located significantly apart from each other, PLAAF airfields in the region become less effective due to topography.

Figure 2: PLAAF Airfields in Tibet

Ngari Gunsa (Figure 2) has a long dual-use runway from where UAVs, fighters like J-11 and various ISR platforms can be operated in addition to strategic and tactical transport aircraft. However, due to adverse weather (crosswinds) and snow for a large part of the year, the base has limited capability for sustained high-intensity operations. The airfield is not likely to be a launch base for large operations and will be restricted to air defence and Combat Air Patrols (CAP) primarily for political signaling.

Hotan airfield is located at a much lower elevation than Ngari Gunsa but is almost double the distance from LAC (Figure 2). The base can launch sustained high-intensity all-weather operations and is also well-connected with China’s interior infrastructure and transportation grid. All kinds of fighter, transport and bomber operations can be launched from Hotan. In the event of a crisis, Hotan, along with other interior bases, will launch most missions, and Ngari Gunsa and other smaller airfields will primarily be used for replenishment, forward CAP and ISR missions. The overall PLAAF strategy would be increased forward presence with rear-area sustainment. In such a scenario, sortie sustainability and not just proximity to the LAC will prove decisive. While Ngari is politically potent, it is severely operationally constrained. That is the primary reason why the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), with its large arsenal of medium and short-range ballistic missiles, will play a decisive role if not neutralised or countered. 

To mitigate operational restrictions from high altitude airfields, PLAAF has also created multiple heliports across the entire LAC and International Boundary (IB). China follows a hub and spoke infrastructure development model with an aim to link all major cities with high-speed rail and multi-lane highways. The large hubs are cities with well-developed air, road and rail infrastructure and capable of sustaining large scale operations. From these hubs smaller road and rail laterals branch out to the border areas and smaller towns. China has built extensive rail infrastructure across high-altitude areas in Tibet (Figure 3). Inbuilt redundancy in the transportation network provides multiple options to PLA and also improves reaction time, mitigating the problem of shortage of airfields in the area. 

Figure 3: Rail Network in Tibet

Source: Tour Travel Tibet, Accessed on March 04, 2026.

India needs to rapidly develop road, rail and air infrastructure along the LAC and IB for sustaining operations as well as connecting forward areas. ALGs like DBO and Fukche need to be upgraded and additional heliports created (Figure 4). To support this development, there will be a need to create more roads and high-altitude rail infrastructure in the region.

Figure 4: Indian Airfields and ALGs in Eastern Ladakh

India has the advantage of launching air operations from in-depth bases with no major weight and payload constraints and that must be capitalised on. Development of forward airfields and creation of additional Greenfield Airports in EL, Central Sector and the North-East will go a long way in enhancing India’s combat effectiveness. Existing airfields like Leh and Thoise also need to be upgraded with additional parallel runways, HAS and WSAs, facilitating all-weather 24x7 operations. Developing a layered transportation infrastructure and carrying out dispersed operations would provide Indian forces adequate resilience and options when required. 

Nyoma is hence not just an airstrip; it is the unblinking beacon that not only displays national resolve at the LAC but also demands continued funding to prevent a future Galwan from happening. In high altitude operations, geography and topography are combatants where not just aircraft numbers but resilient operational logistics, engineering capability and ability to capitalise on defence in depth will prove decisive.