THE INTELLIGENCE FRONT IN THE US-CHINA COMPETITION

In China’s recent purge of top military officials, General Zhang Youxia, a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, and Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission. An editorial published in People's Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC, and having “fostered political and corruption problems that undermined the party’s absolute leadership over the military and threatened the party’s ruling foundation.”

Beyond the usual anti-corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons program to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” the video portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. These outreach efforts are designed to deepen internal mistrust while positioning itself as a discreet alternative for officers who may feel vulnerable or exposed.

China has countered this narrative by expanding and strengthening its counterintelligence apparatus, aimed at limiting the ability of the CIA to exploit fractures within the PLA. However, these efforts are compounded by new constraints placed on the American intelligence apparatus under recent moves by the Trump administration. As competition between the two powers intensifies, specific policy shifts have risked tilting the strategic balance further into China’s favour, with significant repercussions for the intelligence landscape and broader global security.

A History of Intelligence Operations and Resets

Intelligence rivalry between the two powers stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear program by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best. Between October 1950 and July 1953, the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.

As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The alliance became one of the agency’s most romanticized initiatives, less for its effectiveness than for the aura surrounding the Tibetan cause. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, it also provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. The agency also facilitated the escape of protest leaders, working with sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations again deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.

These operations were not without cost. Between 2010 and 2012, Chinese authorities systematically dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.

Espionage in the Xi Jinping Era

Estimates in 2024 indicated that China’s primary intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 officers at the height of the KGB. After coming to power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.

His approach was also influenced by revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. Xi’s consolidation was also shaped by the Zhou Yongkang affair, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.

In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls. Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security.

In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work.” The messaging often targeted journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople. Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.

China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.

In January 2026, reports emerged alleging that China had orchestrated a sustained cyber-espionage campaign by hacking the mobile phones of senior Downing Street officials for several years, compromising private communications and targeting close aides to Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak between 2021 and 2024. US officials had also earlier stated that Chinese hackers targeted Donald Trump, JD Vance, and Kamala Harris in the run-up to the 2024 presidential election.

Washington’s Eroding Advantage

As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses also faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.

As espionage activities expanded beyond traditional human intelligence operations, the focus increasingly shifted toward technological and cyber domains. In 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns.

In 2024, MSS was also linked to advanced persistent threat groups such as Salt Typhoon, which authorities announced had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track. Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Center and a technology intelligence center to address it.

As the Trump administration returned to power in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. The administration’s adherence to an “America First” doctrine and Trump’s transactional approach to international affairs made US policy appear unpredictable, short term, and susceptible to abrupt reversals. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200  positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships.

The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed senior national security officials sharing classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by American intelligence assets worldwide.

As China works to expand its influence and reshape the international order by escalating espionage and security operations, international scrutiny of its actions has intensified. The recruitment video strategy signals a more assertive human intelligence effort aimed at penetrating Xi’s inner security establishment, yet the more consequential question is whether such an aggressive push into PLA ranks can meaningfully succeed at a time when the Trump administration is simultaneously scaling back personnel, resources, and institutional depth within the agency itself.

Trump’s planned visit to China in April, will therefore be watched not just for diplomatic optics, but for what it reveals about strategic coherence. Can the United States realistically expand clandestine operations abroad while weakening the very institution responsible for carrying them out? Or are the recruitment videos less a long term intelligence strategy and more a calculated pressure tactic meant to unsettle Xi during a period of elite political vulnerability? The answer will show whether this episode is a real turning point in the shadow war or merely symbolic signaling in a contest that requires enduring institutional capacity.