China’s growing emphasis on science and technology expertise is revealing how the Party is reshaping the foundations of its development strategy. The 2026 Beidaihe summit offers a useful case study into this shift, with greater representation of senior scientists, basic and applied research, and state-affiliated institutions. Compared with 2025, the changing profile of invited experts points to a stronger emphasis on centralised talent mobilisation and Party oversight. The emerging pattern highlights how Beijing is aligning scientific innovation with political priorities and technological self-reliance under the 15th Five-Year Plan.

Science and technology is assuming an increasingly prominent position in China's political, economic and public life. A subtle yet substantial indication of championing technology talent is the growing public visibility accorded to scientists and scientific achievement in public places like metro stations and shopping centres. Contrasting this is the more high-profile and politically significant inclusion of academics and private sector experts invited to engage and interact with Chinese leaders at the 2026 Beidaihe summit. Together, the public-facing dimension complements the more institutionalised incorporation of experts into policymaking, signalling the importance of science and technology to China’s future development. The sci-tech focus of China’s Fifteenth Year Plan (FYP) reiterates the importance of strengthening basic research for advancing the industrial and manufacturing foundations of high-quality development. This emphasis on science and technology in China’s development strategy locates individuals and talent prominently in shaping the frontiers of strategic competition between China and the West. 

Against this backdrop, the 2026 Beidaihe summit offers a useful case study of how the growing importance of science and technology is highlighted by China’s political system. This year’s Summit included 60 experts who mainly specialised in basic research, strategic and frontier technology, and core technologies in key fields, along with philosophical studies and social sciences. Compared to the publicly-available list of experts invited in 2025, the composition, background and affiliation of experts in 2026 reflect a shift in the foundations supporting high-quality development, new quality productive forces and tech-industrial policy.

Optics and Politics

This year’s experts invited to Beidaihe interacted with Cai Qi, highlighting the Party’s preference for strong oversight of technology-related issues given Cai Qi’s proximity to Xi Jinping. Although Ding Xuexiang, another Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the Central Science and Technology Commission, is responsible for emphasising science and technology policies, the outsized role of Cai Qi by contrast, suggests that “redness” remains a necessary guiding principle for the “correct” development of expertise. Furthermore, Cai Qi’s speech reflected the importance of the top-down, central planning framework of the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), highlighting the significance of political guidance for scientific development. Interestingly, Shen Yiqin, State Counsellor and President of the All-China Women’s Federation, who was present for the interaction with Experts in 2025, was absent this year. Her absence perhaps hints at a turnover in her position as State Councilor, just before or after the 21st Party Congress.

The thematic focus of this year’s retreat was “Advancing the 15th Five-Year Plan”, which calls for implementation of plans and mobilisation of resources. As stated in provincial and national development planning documents released earlier this year, China will allocate greater resources to the science and technology sector during the 15th FYP period to address key bottlenecks. Beidaihe also reflected the same priorities; basic research was mentioned first in this year's retreat report (compared to third last year), and explicit mention was made of “strategic frontier technologies” and “key core technologies”. Overall, this is consistent with the continued emphasis by Xi Jinping on basic research, as he called it the “source of the entire scientific system and the main switch for all technical challenges”. On the other hand, while Beijing emphasises the role of basic research, the practical and commercial dimensions of science and technology innovation are equally vital.

Beijing’s interest in individuals working in application-oriented fields reflect the concern with translating basic scientific innovation into practical applications. One invitee to Beidaihe, Qian Qihu, a military engineer and pioneer of China’s modern protective engineering theory, spent decades researching the protection of facilities against nuclear explosions and earth-penetrating weapons. Another, Zhang Haibin, served as the chief designer of Mengxiang, China’s first deep-ocean drilling vessel and the youngest participant, Yuan Yang has not only worked on the theoretical foundations in AI but also on the use of artificial intelligence in traditional Chinese medicine. Their presence is significant in the context of the 15th FYP, which identifies “self-reliance and strength in science and technology” as a major objective through 2030.

Composition and Comparison with 2025

What does publicly available information about the composition of experts gathered at Beidaihe tell us? First, the change in age composition between 2025 and 2026 (Graph 1) suggests that greater representation has been accorded to seniority and experience, which would be required to guide the development of key strategic sectors. The average age of invitees in 2026 increased from 53.37 years to 59.75 years. Although the number of publicly-disclosed experts who attended Beidaihe is only a sample of all invitees; 28 of 60 in 2026, and 16 in 2025, the shift is illustrative of the mobilisation of talent resources and search for experience. Moreover, 46% of the experts who we know attended Beidaihe this year were in their sixties, whereas approximately 76% of those invited in 2025 were below the age of 60.

Graph 1: Comparing Age Distribution of Experts Who We Know Attended Beidaihe in 2026 and 2025

 

A comparison of the geographic distribution of the workplaces of experts we know attended Beidaihe in 2025 and 2026 (Graph 2) is suggestive of the bases of science and technology expertise that Beijing's political class is dependent on for the execution of national plans. In 2026, Beijing was home to the workplaces of around 71% of the experts invited, compared to 44% in 2025. This reflects Beijing’s consistent prominence in hosting institutions of national technological importance. Moreover, it also reveals that science and technology talent is concentrated in the capital, reflecting centralised control of innovation exerted by the Party. There is also a clear continuity in sourcing experts from coastal provinces, where technology innovation is more prominent than in inland ones. 

Graph 2: Province of Occupation of Beidaihe Invitees

The sectoral representation of experts we know who were present at Beidaihe this year is interesting for a couple of reasons. First, unlike last year, the public list of attendees in 2026 did not feature private-sector participants. Last year’s guest list included Liu Qingfeng, Founder of iFlyTek, and Wu Yunkun, president of cybersecurity firm Qi An Xin Technology (QAX). However, this year’s list has no members from the private sector. It perhaps reveals a shift towards seeking consultation from state-aligned sectoral experience, given their natural coordination with central planners. Based on comparison of samples in 2026 and 2025 (Graph 3), SOE’s representation may have grown, as 29% of invitees were from SOEs in 2026, compared to 19% in 2025. Overall, attendees in 2026 were sourced from academic institutions and universities, with over 60% in 2026 and just over 70% in 2025.

Graph 3: Sectoral Composition of Invitees to Beidaihe in 2026 and 2025


Fourth, the segment composition of invitees we know were at Beidaihe offers a useful window into which areas of expertise the leadership chose to consult (Graph 4). Basic Science was the largest segment in 2026 at 29%, followed by Applied Science at 21%, which together account for half of the 2026 sample. This is a strong indication of a premium on foundational research and its translation into national capability. In 2025, by contrast, AI & Technology led at 25%, with Humanities and Basic Science each at 19%, Manufacturing and Medical Sciences each at 13%, and Law and Transport each at 6%. Interestingly, in 2026, the sample showed experts from the military domain (7%) in the publicly-disclosed lists, compared to none in 2025.

Graph 4: Segment Composition of Invitees to Beidaihe in 2026 and 2025

 

The Big Picture

Overall, the significance of science and technology expertise growing prominently in China’s political landscape underscores the Party’s continued primacy in directing its development, especially under the 15th FYP framework. The increased representation of senior experts, concentration of expertise in Beijing and greater presence of state-affiliated institutions suggest that talent mobilisation remains firmly embedded within a centralised, Party-led framework. Political gatherings in China are demonstrating that scientific and technological expertise is increasingly indispensable to strategic policymaking. 

Author

Rahul Karan Reddy is Senior Research Associate at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). He works on domestic Chinese politics and trade, producing data-driven research in the form of reports, dashboards and digital media. He is the author of ‘Islands on the Rocks’, a monograph on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute between China and Japan. He is the creator of the India-China Trade dashboard, the Chinese Provincial Development Indicators dashboard and co-lead for the project ‘Episodes of India-China Exchanges: Modern Bridges and Resonant Connections’. He is co-convenor of ORCA’s annual conference, the Global Conference on New Sinology (GCNS) and co-editor of ORCA’s daily newsletter, Conversations in Chinese Media (CiCM). He was previously a Research Analyst at the Chennai Center for China Studies (C3S), working on China’s foreign policy and domestic politics. His work has been published in The Diplomat, 9 Dash Line, East Asia Forum, ISDP & Tokyo Review, among others. He is also the Director of ORCA Consultancy.

Neha Maurya is a Project Assistant at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). A recent graduate of FLAME University with a major in International Studies and a minor in Public Policy, her research interests include strategic studies, governance, and education policy. She is interested in contributing to research that informs effective policy design and implementation.

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