Official statements issued by governments, reportage of events by state media and their discussion on social media are particularly instructive of how states signal foreign policy postures, and define the contours of discourse on key external issues. The car bomb blast on 10th November in New Delhi and suicide bombing on 11th November in Islamabad have been widely reported and discussed on Chinese state media and social media platforms.
Their coverage and discourse reflect strategies and narratives underpinning the treatment of India and Pakistan in China’s media ecosystem. While reportage on mainstream state media has largely focused on the details and facts of the incident, commentaries by bloggers and social media opinions are much sharper and speculative in their discussion of events. They reflect the public’s positive view of Pakistan, hawkish and hardened posture towards India and skewed perspectives of South Asia, dovetailing with China’s foreign policy narratives. It also shows how vocal opinion makers inform domestic audiences to accept skewed narratives and unfavourable impressions of India, particularly on terrorism and security. Meanwhile, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) official responses, state media coverage and social media discussions of the incidents reveal communication strategies, political signalling and media narratives that underpin how China presents terrorism in South Asia to domestic and global audiences.
Contextual Contrasts in Government Response
Official statements by Beijing indicate how China adopts subtly varying communication strategies in its response to terrorist incidents in India and Pakistan. China’s MOFA and the Chinese Embassy in India have so far, on record, only described the terror incident in New Delhi as an “explosion”. Granted, these statements were made before the Indian government officially termed the bomb blast a “terrorist incident”. Nonetheless, China has not issued a follow-up statement or social media update through official accounts calling the incident a terror attack.
In the case of the bombing in Pakistan, MOFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun was quick to “strongly condemn” the “attack” in Islamabad. While the difference in context of events in India and Pakistan, and timing of official confirmation that the motive of the incidents was terrorism, could explain the variation in terminology and statements, Beijing’s support for Pakistan and its position on terrorism comes through in China’s statement of “resolute support” to Pakistan.
Additionally, China’s official statement on the Delhi incident first clarifies that there were no Chinese casualties, before expressing shock and extending sympathies. In its statement on the bombing in Pakistan, the statement first condemns the attack and expresses sympathies before stating that there were no Chinese casualties. These subtle variations maybe chalked off as inadvertent or unintended, but they more likely reflect China’s foreign policy thinking on India and Pakistan, which is to counterbalance India by supporting Pakistan.
Moreover, the social media channel of the Chinese embassy in Pakistan was quick to “strongly condemn” the terror attack in Islamabad, reacting almost in real-time to release a message on X. By contrast, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in India on X has only repeated, on 12th November, the statement made by MOFA on 11th November. The subtly differing social media communication strategies highlight China’s signalling of its foreign policy preference for Pakistan.
State Media and Commentaries
Although official statements reflect the subtle variations in communicating China’s response to terrorism in India and Pakistan, state media coverage has remained majorly focused on the facts and details. Initial reports from state media like Xinhua, People’s Daily and CCTV focused on details of casualties and witness reactions in India. The reportage was squarely centred on factual information, avoiding speculation and hyperbole. CCTV on the 11th expanded their reportage by including eyewitness accounts and details of investigations into the terror attack. By 12th and 13th November, state media reported on the bombing as a “terrorist incident” and mentioned remarks made by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Home Minister Amit Shah. Even provincial newspapers and platforms in Beijing and Tianjin carried reports of the terror incident in India, and the news of the incident was ranked 45th in Baidu’s Hot Search list with over 3 million index points.
The suicide bombing in Islamabad was also reported by state media like Xinhua and CCTV with the same focus on facts and details. A notable difference is that coverage of the attack in Pakistan was relatively more extensive, enabled by the presence of CCTV reporters on the ground in Pakistan. The surprisingly restrained reportage of events in India, and absence of major deviations in approach towards India and Pakistan is perhaps a result of the newly normalised relationship between China and India. However, although state media abstained from speculation and skewed presentations, commentaries by bloggers and writers on news platforms on Sina, QQ and others engaged in speculation and conjecture.
Some commentaries by writers and citizens focused their discussion on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, arguing that the bomb blast would affect the Prime Minister’s “strongman persona”. Moreover, they inaccurately claim that the incident has turned public opinion and the media against the government, questioning its “ineffective counter-terrorism efforts”. Similarly, another argued that the Modi government is “facing dual pressures from both inside and outside the country”, speculating that if the investigations confirm an external hand in the bomb blast, it would mount pressure on the Modi government.
Commentaries on the incident in New Delhi also frame India as reactive, but restricted by capabilities, with some arguing that it could give New Delhi a reason to launch “another Operation Sindoor”. Blogs on Chinese media platforms present New Delhi as likely to pursue a “reflexive response” that could push nuclear-armed India and Pakistan into a conflict, but also militarily incapable of effectively subduing Pakistan. More broadly, from a South Asian perspective, most Chinese commentaries on the incidents in India and Pakistan paint a bleak picture of the region, stating that it is geopolitically fragile and on the brink of war.
Social Media Coverage
Users on Chinese social media platforms discussed the bomb blast in India from specific perspectives, reflecting the limited public perception of India’s domestic politics, security environment and terrorism in South Asia. One post on Zhihu by a user with 75,000 followers attempted to detail the incident, and stated that the “Indian police and media acted quite recklessly” for releasing information of the vehicle involved in the bomb blast. Such posts attempted to deconstruct the domestic political and security situation in the aftermath of the incident through suppositions and speculation. Others referenced religious divides in Indian society to explain the causes of the incident.
Posts by news bloggers on Weibo discussing the incident featured comments accusing India of harbouring terrorists, in clear alignment with Pakistan’s position on India. Other, seemingly more objective but speculative, posts questioned if there another war was about to break out between India and Pakistan. Despite the talk of war, the hashtag “Modi’s Unusual Restraint During Delhi Bombings” was a notable trend, with 150,000 views peaking on 13th November. Several users also expressed shock upon hearing the news of the bomb blast, while others urged India and Pakistan to “keep fighting”, reflecting China’s interests in ensuring India-Pakistan relations remain hostile.
These two incidents happening in India and Pakistan respectively over the course of one week have shown that the coverage of terrorism by the Chinese media ecosystem largely reinforces the state’s foreign policy narratives and preferences for alignment in South Asia. Pakistan emerges as a clear preference for the public, which is reinforced by commentators and opinion makers on non-state news media platforms. While state media coverage can be expected to remain relatively neutral or fact-centric in its reportage of India and Pakistan for as long as normalisation of relations between India and China lasts, the same cannot be said for social media discourse. Amplified by vocal news bloggers and underpinned by limited perspectives on India, public perception and popular sentiment is likely to skew unfavourable on matters relating to India’s security environment in which China has a direct or indirect interest.
Author
Rahul Karan Reddy
Rahul Karan Reddy is Senior Research Associate at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). He works on domestic Chinese politics and trade, producing data-driven research in the form of reports, dashboards and digital media. He is the author of ‘Islands on the Rocks’, a monograph on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute between China and Japan. He is the creator of the India-China Trade dashboard, the Chinese Provincial Development Indicators dashboard and co-lead for the project ‘Episodes of India-China Exchanges: Modern Bridges and Resonant Connections’. He is co-convenor of ORCA’s annual conference, the Global Conference on New Sinology (GCNS) and co-editor of ORCA’s daily newsletter, Conversations in Chinese Media (CiCM). He was previously a Research Analyst at the Chennai Center for China Studies (C3S), working on China’s foreign policy and domestic politics. His work has been published in The Diplomat, 9 Dash Line, East Asia Forum, ISDP & Tokyo Review, among others. He is also the Director of ORCA Consultancy.